Fame, Parody, and Policing in Trademark Law by Lemley, Mark A.
FAME, PARODY, AND POLICING IN 
TRADEMARK LAW 
Mark A. Lemley* 
2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 
I. THE TRADEMARK POLICE STATE .................................................... 2 
II. POLICING PARODIES .................................................................... 10 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 19 
APPENDIX A ..................................................................................... 20 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Trademark owners regularly overreach. They often threaten or 
sue people they have no business suing, including satirists, parodists, 
non-commercial users, and gripe sites. When they do, they often 
justify their aggressive legal conduct by pointing to the need to protect 
their trademarks by policing infringement. Courts have in fact 
indicated at various points that policing is, if not strictly necessary, at 
least a way to strengthen a mark. But courts have never held that 
efforts to block speech-related uses are necessary or even helpful in 
obtaining a strong mark. Several scholars have accordingly argued that 
overzealous policing is unnecessary, has harmful effects, and ought to 
be punished. But trademark owners continue to do it, in part because 
it is largely (though not completely) costless, and because if there is 
even a chance a failure to police will cost owners their trademark, they 
won’t want to take the chance. So, not only does trademark law 
currently fail to prevent overreaching, it affirmatively encourages it. 
In this Article, I suggest a way that we can align trademark 
owner enforcement incentives with good public policy. The presence 
of unauthorized parodies, satires, and complaint sites related to a mark 
should be evidence of the fame of the mark and perhaps even a 
requirement for status as a famous mark. Taking this approach would 
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be consistent with what we know about how society interacts with 
trademarks. Famous marks become part of a social conversation in a 
way that ordinary marks don’t.1 My approach has empirical support: 
The best-known brands draw more parodies and criticism sites than 
non-famous marks, and those parodies don’t interfere with the fame 
of the mark. And my approach would give trademark owners an 
affirmative reason to leave critics, satirists, and parodists alone. 
In Part I, I talk about the problem. In Part II, I talk about how we 
might solve it and consider some objections.  
I. THE TRADEMARK POLICE STATE 
Trademark owners regularly overreach. They make extremely 
broad claims for their marks, trying to control simple shapes, words, 
or even letters regardless of context or of whether trademark law gives 
any right over those things. Sometimes these claims are brought 
against competitors.2 Other times they are brought against companies 
in very different product fields who want to use a similar mark or 
logo.3  
More alarming, trademark owners regularly bring claims against 
social and political speech that uses their marks in ways they don’t 
                                                   
 1. See Jessica Kiser, Brandright, 70 ARK. L. REV. 489, 493 (2017); Giulio 
Ernesto Yaquinto, Note, The Social Significance of Modern Trademarks: Authorizing 
the Appropriation of Marks as Source Identifiers for Expressive Works, 95 TEX. L. 
REV. 739, 740 (2017); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks 
as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397 (2014). 
 2. See, e.g., M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 1370, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the registrant of “iWatch” lacked the requisite intent for 
validity in a case brought by competitor Swatch); Deere & Co. v. M.T.D. Prods., Inc., 
41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the injunction of a mark’s use by a 
competitor, even in the context of an attack ad).  
 3. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 624-25 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (denying claims by a cereal maker with “Toucan Sam” word mark and 
logos against a golfing company with “Toucan Gold” word mark and logos); Kim 
Bhasin, Adidas Trademark War Means Three Stripes and You’re in Court, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2017 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2017-03-15/adidas-trademark-war-means-three-stripes-and-you-re-out#footnote-
1489527826255 [https://perma.cc/F5FT-XSD9] (describing Adidas contesting 
Tesla’s Model 3 car logo registration for supposed similarity to its three stripes, 
leading Tesla to withdraw its application and change its logo without litigation). 
Parodies of course often involve unrelated products if they involve products at all. 
See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 608-09 (E.D. Va. 1997) (alleging that the mark 
“Greatest Snow on Earth” for state license plate and tourism marketing purposes 
diluted plaintiff’s “Greatest Show on Earth” mark for a circus).  
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like. Trademark owners sue parodists.4 They sue satirists.5 They sue 
gripe sites.6 They sue competitors who make fun of them7 and other 
                                                   
 4. See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 
1095, 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding the “Pig Pen” club depicted in the streets 
of a Grand Theft Audio video game was protected parody of the “Play Pen” club); 
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming 
summary judgment for defendant artist of “Barbie Enchiladas,” “Fondue a la Barbie,” 
and other artistic parodies); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 908 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding “[t]he parties are advised to chill” in the case of Barbie maker 
against the record company behind “The Barbie Girl” song); Hormel Foods Corp. v. 
Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding Muppet character 
“Spa’am” did not infringe SPAM trademark); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My 
Other Bag, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that a canvas tote 
that depicted a Louis Vuitton handbag with the text “My Other Bag” in a parody of 
“my other car” bumper stickers did not infringe Louis Vuitton’s trademarks); see also 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 
474-77 (2013) (reviewing trademark cases involving parodies).  
 5. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394, 1400-01, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding use of Dr. Seuss trademark was satiric 
not parodic and so unprotected); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 
26, 27, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding a pornographic magazine’s two-page “L.L. Beam’s 
Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog [sic]” feature was a protected parody of the L.L. Bean 
catalog); Bill Donahue, Brand Battles: HBO Aims to Depose ‘Game of Thorns’, 
LAW360 (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1091764 
[https://perma.cc/KP7J-T3X8] (reporting a challenge by the owners of the Game of 
Thrones trademark against an effort by a botanical garden to brand its educational 
programs “Game of Thorns”); Bill Donahue, Brand Battles: NASA, Ivy League, ‘Lord 
of the Rings’, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1089922 
[https://perma.cc/NBD6-D3XY] (reporting a challenge by the owners of the Lord of 
the Rings trademark against a confectioner who wanted to use “Lord of Meringues” 
as a trademark); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 4, at 498-500 (discussing cases 
and the elusive distinction between parody and satire); cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994) (distinguishing parody in a copyright 
context, which pokes fun at the protected material, from satire, which uses the 
protected material to poke fun at something else, but noting that both can be 
protected). 
 6. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 311, 321-22 (4th Cir. 
2005) (holding no actionable infringement for use of Reverend Jerry Falwell’s mark 
in www.fallwell.com, a noncommercial site critical of Falwell’s views on gay people); 
Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005); TMI, Inc., v. 
Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding no violation of the Lanham 
Act for www.trendmakerhome.com, a website critical of the company of that name); 
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003); Savannah Coll. of Art 
& Design, Inc., v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935, 957-58 (S.D. Ohio 2004) 
(holding graduate student’s scad.info and other websites critical of SCAD not 
actionable under the Lanham Act because noncommercial uses of the mark are not 
actionable under the Lanham Act); Bally Total Fitness v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 
1168 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
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companies who make cultural references to them.8 They sue movies 
and TV shows that depict their products in ways they find 
unflattering.9 They sue politicians who use their marks in campaign 
ads and speeches.10 They sue people who use their trademarks to talk 
about the plaintiff’s own products.11 They sue people who make 
posters, T-shirts, and plush toys that evoke their marks, even when it 
is beyond doubt that it is not the trademark owners who are selling 
those products.12  
                                                   
 7. See, e.g., Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 41 (affirming the injunction of a 
competitor’s attack ad with an animation of a John Deere deer fleeing a small barking 
dog and its own Yard-Man lawn tractor). 
 8. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 
Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012 WL 1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (finding that a 
one-second shot in a Hyundai Super Bowl commercial of a basketball covered in 
interlocking LV marks infringed on and diluted Louis Vuitton’s trademark); Am. 
Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728-29 (D. Minn. 
1998) (enjoining a film about rural beauty contest seeking to use “Dairy Queens” as 
title). 
 9. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 413, 420-21 & nn.31-34 (2010) (describing instances where New York 
University, Stanford University, the University of Utah, and Major League Baseball 
objected to their depictions in television shows and movies); William McGeveran, 
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008). 
 10. See, e.g., MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 
00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404, at *1, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (finding 
that a political ad using Mastercard’s “Priceless” template to critique the presence of 
money in politics to be noncommercial and non-misleading). I represented Nader in 
this case. See also Hershey Co. v. Friends of Steve Hershey, 33 F. Supp. 3d 588, 595 
(D. Md. 2014) (granting an injunction for candy bar maker against Senator Hershey’s 
campaign for using Hershey Co.’s trade dress to leverage its goodwill and not “for 
parody, political commentary, or other communicative purposes”); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. 
High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 935-36 (D.D.C. 1985) (dismissing a filmmaker’s 
complaint against political groups using “Star Wars” to describe President Reagan’s 
Strategic Defense Initiative). 
 11. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 
1182-83 (9th Cir. 2010) (vacating an injunction against a non-misleading use of 
Toyota marks by an independent auto broker); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 
F.3d 796, 799-800 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding a former Playboy Playmate’s use of 
Playboy’s marks to describe her career nominative); New Kids on the Block v. News 
Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 308-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the use of band’s name in 
newspaper poll was nominative under a new test). 
 12. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack 
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 481-82 n.54 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding infringement even 
though parties earlier stipulated that no consumer was actually confused about the 
origin or licensure of knock-off university sports apparel); Louis Vuitton Malletier 
S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252, 261, 263 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that a plush “Chewy Vuitton” puppy toy was a non-infringing parody of Louis 
Vuitton, which succeeded by allowing consumers to “to perceive the target of the 
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Sometimes—too often—the trademark owners win these suits.13 
More often they lose.14 But even claims that are unlikely to win often 
have the desired effect of scaring off the users. Defending a trademark 
case is expensive, the outcome is uncertain, and the payoff is limited—
you get to keep doing what you were already doing. As a result, far 
too many people and companies with meritorious defenses simply 
drop their parody, satire, complaint, or commentary rather than face 
the prospect of litigation.15 The result is that even though trademark 
                                                   
parody, while simultaneously allowing them to recognize the changes to the mark that 
make the parody funny or biting”); N. Face Apparel Corp. v. Williams Pharmacy, 
Inc., No. 4:09CV2029RWS, 2010 WL 546928, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2010) 
(discussing a case The North Face brought against the maker of “The South Butt” 
apparel); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2008) 
(holding “WALOCAUST,” “WAL-QAEDA,” and similar terms used on merchandise 
sold by a critic of Wal-Mart to be First Amendment-protected, non-infringing uses); 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(enjoining the sale of “Enjoy Cocaine” poster stylized like “Enjoy Coca-Cola” poster); 
Cat Weaver, Blurring Luxury and Art: Nadia Plesner vs Louis Vuitton, 
HYPERALLERGIC (Mar. 25, 2011), https://hyperallergic.com/21392/nadia-plesner-vs-
louis-vuitton/ [https://perma.cc/J3QF-72CA] (discussing Louis Vuitton’s suit against 
an artist who depicted a child in a painting holding a Louis Vuitton purse). 
 13. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (enjoining “Velvet Elvis” as restaurant name); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. 
Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (enjoining the sales of 
“Gucchi Goo” diaper bags); Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., v. Respect 
Sportswear, Inc., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1555, 1564 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (denying the registration 
of “RATED R SPORTSWEAR” lest consumers believe the Motion Picture 
Association of America also monitors apparel); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 
4, at 478 n.27, 484-85 (citing trademark cases, many successful, enjoining parodies); 
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 9, at 417-20 (describing successful cases against 
defendants using trademarks in artistic, parodic, and other non-confusing ways); 
Xiyin Tang, Against Fair Use: The Case for a Genericness Defense in Expressive 
Trademark Uses, 101 IOWA L. REV. 2021, 2039 (2016) (explaining that the current 
doctrine privileges only certain types of expressive uses, notably parodies). 
 14. See, e.g., William McGeveran, The Imaginary Trademark Parody Crisis 
(And the Real One), 90 WASH. L. REV. 713, 728-30 (2015) (explaining that after 
Campbell protected a parodic use of a copyrighted work, “courts now favor [i.e., 
allow] trademark parodies,” too). 
 15. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Two-Tiered Trademark, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 
295, 297 (2018) (“[T]he party that cannot afford the high and increasing cost of 
participation in the trademark system loses . . . not because justice . . . dictates that 
they lose[,] but because they cannot afford to participate in the system. . . . 
[R]esolution will turn solely on which party can afford to litigate.”); Leah Chan 
Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 628-30, 652 
(explaining how the costs of rebuffing “trademark bullies” makes “ceasing to use the 
trademark at stake without a battle” perhaps the least expensive option); William 
McGeveran, supra note 9, at 52 (“The lethal combination of uncertain standards with 
lengthy and costly litigation creates a classic chilling effect upon the unlicensed use 
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owners tend to lose most cases against political and social speech, they 
still end up shutting down quite a bit of socially valuable speech that 
the law is not intended to target. These efforts likely deter even more 
protected speech from ever occurring, particularly because trademark 
owners are aggressively sending threatening cease-and-desist letters 
even when they don’t file suit.16 
When pressed as to why they bring weak trademark claims 
against protected speech, or even against extremely remote marks, 
trademark owners frequently fall back on the justification that they 
have an obligation to police their trademarks against potentially 
infringing uses.17 If they don’t aggressively enforce their marks, they 
worry that the value of their marks will be weakened by multiple, 
                                                   
of trademarks to facilitate speech, even when such uses are perfectly lawful.”); 
Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 585, 588-91 (2008) (describing trademark “strike suits” that would likely lose 
on the merits but that, even when not litigated, accomplish the mark owner’s goal of 
expanding the effective scope of her mark); Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Reirson, 
Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1839 (2007) 
(“Typically, the threat of litigation alone (even when ever so lightly implied) by a 
corporate giant is sufficient to dissuade a person from making fair use of a 
trademark.”); cf. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007) (“[T]rademark users who could mount 
a decent defense against an infringement claim [often will] nevertheless choose to 
seek a license.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 
U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 411-12 (2015) (noting that 97% of disputes never result in a 
lawsuit, much less a judgment, and proposing ways to regulate abusive cease-and-
desist letters); Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 854-57 (2012); William McGeveran, The 
Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2269 (2010) (“For every 
speaker who fights back in court, countless others cautiously back away.”); Elizabeth 
L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (2009) (“Ultimately, current law creates a doctrinally 
imbalanced system that chills speech, increases the transaction costs of content 
creation, and disproportionately harms small or independent content creators.”). 
 17. See William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the 
Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 490-91 n.115 
(2012) (recounting interviews with practitioners who offer this justification for 
threatening to sue others even when the merits of their claim are weak and describing 
case law); Port, supra note 15, at 587 (citing Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown 
Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1982)) (“Of course, trademark 
holders must police their trademarks or suffer the fate of a court subsequently finding 
that trademark holders acquiesced to infringing uses or that the mark now lacks 
distinctiveness.”). 
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conflicting uses.18 In extreme cases, they worry that they will lose their 
marks altogether by having courts deem them generic or abandoned 
or else lose the right to enforce them through laches.19 
It is tempting to dismiss these claims as cynical efforts to justify 
conduct that is in fact intended to deter and suppress protected speech 
the trademark owner simply doesn’t like. And in many cases, that is 
probably the explanation. There doesn’t seem to be any case punishing 
a trademark owner for failing to police a mark against the sorts of 
speech with which I am concerned here. Indeed, I didn’t find a single 
case holding a mark abandoned or otherwise lost solely for failure to 
police the mark at all. All the cases considering the issue point in the 
opposite direction.20 Further, policing alone is generally insufficient to 
save a mark from becoming generic.21 Courts have generally 
considered policing (or lack thereof) as just one piece of evidence 
when evaluating strength of the mark, likelihood of confusion, 
genericide, and laches. It is tempting, therefore, to view the whole 
requirement of trademark policing as a myth, rather like the received 
                                                   
 18. Jeremy Sheff refers to this as fear-driven enforcement. Jeremy N. Sheff, 
Fear and Loathing in Trademark Enforcement, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA, 
& ENT. L.J. 873, 874-77 (2012). 
 19. See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1101-02 
(9th Cir. 2004) (setting out the test for laches and stating that “[c]ompanies expecting 
judicial enforcement of their marks must conduct an effective policing effort” 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 834 
(9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting))); Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1791, 
1834-42 (discussing the perceived need to police infringement to avoid genericide).  
 20. For cases rejecting abandonment claims based on failure to police, see, 
for example, Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding no abandonment despite at least 
five different alcoholic beverages that use the term VEUVE); Hermes Int’l v. Lederer 
de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2000); Navajo Nation v. Urban 
Outfitters, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1105 (D.N.M. 2016) (“[T]he existence of third-
party infringers does not by itself constitute abandonment of a mark where the mark 
owner does not consent to its use, provided that the mark does not lose all ability to 
identify the senior user.”); and Patsy’s Italian Rest., Inc. v. Banas, 508 F. Supp. 2d 
194, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 21. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 
1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[Policing], however, is not of itself sufficient to create legally 
protectable rights.”); Hickory Farms, Inc. v. Snackmasters, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 716, 
723 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“[P]olicing is of no consequence to a resolution of whether a 
mark is generic.”) (quoting Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems Inc., 874 
F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989))); see also Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. 
Supp. 2d 286, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
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(but inaccurate) wisdom that you shouldn’t let your mark be used as a 
verb for fear that it will be declared generic.22 
But the reality is a bit more complicated. A failure to police can 
be a factor leading to genericide, even if it is not itself determinative.23 
Policing can influence the scope of protection. Some courts have 
found trademarks to be stronger because of vigorous efforts to police 
the mark against infringing uses.24 On the flip side, a number of courts 
have found the strength of the mark decreased due to the presence of 
a number of other, similar marks, and the mark thus entitled to only a 
narrow scope of protection.25 While that is not specifically a finding 
                                                   
 22. See Rose A. Hagan, The Myths of Genericide, 22 IPL NEWSL. 13, 13 
(2004) (finding that no trademark in history has been held generic merely because it 
was used as a verb). That myth was dispelled for good, I suspect, in Elliott v. Google 
Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 23. See BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (“While the ‘Walking Fingers’ logo may once have been a strong candidate 
for trademark protection, through common usage by virtually all classified directory 
publishers it can no longer be understood to represent a source of the directories.”); 
Malaco Leaf, AB v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 355, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (“This Court agrees that the generic design of Malaco’s Swedish Fish, along 
with extensive third party use of the design and Malaco’s failure to police infringing 
third-party uses, renders the Swedish Fish design generic and unprotectable.”). 
 24. See Morningside Grp. Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Grp., L.L.C., 182 F.3d 
133, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he successful policing of a mark adds to its strength to 
the extent that it prevents weakening of the mark’s distinctiveness in the relevant 
market.”); Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 781 F. Supp. 2d 396, 419 (N.D. Tex. 2011); 
Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989). 
 25. See, e.g., CareFirst of Maryland, Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 
270 (4th Cir. 2006) (“This evidence of extensive third-party use also demonstrates 
that CareFirst’s mark lacks commercial strength in many parts of the country.”); 
Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 
1079, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1982) (treating an organization’s historical lack of control 
over its marks as important in determining that there was no likelihood of confusion 
as to the source of the mark); Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Federal Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1981) (indicating that in 1976, there were over 
4400 businesses registered with the word “Sun” in their names); Amstar Corp. v. 
Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 265 (5th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that “[a] trademark 
owner that strongly believed its customers were being deceived would hardly have 
remained idle for such an extended period of time,” and so narrowing Amstar’s 
DOMINO mark to sugar field); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 
496, 505 (5th Cir. 1979) (reasoning that the fact eighty-five firms using WORLD in 
carpet retailing and manufacturing “militates against the finding of likelihood of 
confusion”); Fuel Clothing Co. v. Nike, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 594, 611-13 (D.S.C. 2014) 
(reasoning that the fact that over 1,000 marks included “Fuel” weakened the strength 
of plaintiff’s mark, and granting summary judgment to defendant on most claims); 
Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733, 744-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding “Columbia” relatively weak as mark in healthcare 
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that failure to police narrows the scope of a trademark owner’s rights, 
it provides a significant legal incentive to police because failure to do 
so can allow similar marks to proliferate and cabin the trademark 
owner’s rights.  
Further, while policing alone won’t prevent a mark from 
becoming generic, some courts that have rejected claims of genericide 
have pointed to the absence of competing uses of the mark as a factor, 
and that absence sometimes results from aggressive enforcement.26 
Policing is also relevant to laches. Courts will not enforce a 
trademark if the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in filing suit and 
the defendant is prejudiced as a result.27 Unreasonable delay is 
measured from the time of either actual or constructive knowledge of 
the competing use.28 The constructive knowledge standard effectively 
imposes on a trademark owner the duty to be aware of potential 
infringers, and probably to take some action, because a trademark 
owner that should have been aware of a use won’t avoid laches 
because of her ignorance.29  
                                                   
industry because of substantial third-party use by hospitals, healthcare services, and 
institutions). 
 26. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“Pfizer’s active policing efforts also refute Defendants’ claim that the Viagra Marks 
are generic.”); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (“[D]ue to Frito–Lay’s vigorous policing efforts . . . [defendant] can offer no 
evidence of widespread industry use.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 824 (7th Cir. 
1999) (holding laches applied because “Hot Wax sat idly by and chose not to 
challenge” while Turtle Wax invested in the mark for a ten- to twenty-year period); 
Kason Indus., Inc. v. Component Hardware Grp., Inc., 120 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 
1997) (setting out test for doctrine of laches in trademark, including delay without 
excuse); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In 
a trademark case, courts may apply the doctrine of estoppel by laches to deny relief 
to a plaintiff who, though having knowledge of an infringement, has, to the detriment 
of the defendant, unreasonably delayed in seeking redress.”). 
 28. Kason, 120 F.3d at 1203. But cf. What-A-Burger of Virginia, Inc. v. 
Whataburger, Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 449 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Instead of focusing on when 
the trademark owner first knew that another party was using its mark, the court should 
be trying to determine the time at which the use became infringing and the time at 
which the owner should have known it . . . .”).  
 29. See E-Systems, Inc., v. Monitek, Inc., 720 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(“Plaintiff ought to have discovered defendant’s use sooner had it been diligently 
seeking to enforce its mark.”); Black Diamond Sportswear, Inc. v. Black Diamond 
Equip., Ltd., No. 06-3508-cv, 2007 WL 2914452, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2007) (“A 
trademark owner is ‘chargeable with such knowledge as he might have obtained upon 
[due] inquiry.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. 
Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 1960))); accord Cybergun, S.A. v. Jag 
Precision, No. 2:12-cv-00074-APG-GWF, 2014 WL 7336074, at *3 (D. Nev. 
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The received wisdom that trademark owners must police 
infringement of their marks, then, is overstated but contains important 
kernels of truth. Owners don’t have to police their marks. But doing 
so helps in various ways. Lawyers who advise trademark owners to 
police aren’t wrong, at least not entirely. The issue is gray, not black 
and white. 
II. POLICING PARODIES 
The desirability of stopping obvious acts of infringement—
counterfeiting or the adoption of the same mark by a direct 
competitor—does not mean that trademark owners must or should sue 
anyone who uses their mark or anything like it. And as noted above, 
overreaching by trademark owners who bring claims against parodists 
or critics rather than their commercial competitors causes harm to the 
world. We should discourage such overreach. The question is how. 
One obvious response is for courts to make clear that policing 
one’s mark against infringing uses doesn’t require policing against 
non-infringing uses like parody, criticism, non-trademark use,30 or 
                                                   
Dec. 19, 2014); Brown v. Sixteen, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4630(DAB), 2009 WL 1159161, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009); Saul Zaentz Co. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 
2d 1096, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (explaining “plaintiff is charged with constructive 
knowledge”); Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 318 F. Supp. 2d 923, 943 (C.D. Cal. 
2004); cf. Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1101-02 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (stating a rule that “[c]ompanies expecting judicial enforcement of their 
marks must conduct an effective policing effort,” though in a case where plaintiff did 
not claim ignorance of defendant’s uses (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Int’l Group, 
Inc. v. Am. Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting))). 
 30. This is an argument I have made elsewhere. See Dogan & Lemley, supra 
note 4, at 477-80 & nn.26-28 (arguing for use of the mark as a brand in order to be 
actionable infringement and citing court opinions adopting this trademark use doctrine 
often by referencing the “in connection with” or the “use in commerce” language of 
the Lanham Act); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law 
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1682 (2007) (“Strictly speaking, 
trademark infringement should require not only that a defendant be using the mark to 
promote its own products or services but also that it be using it ‘as a mark’—i.e., to 
indicate the source or sponsorship of those products or services.”). As examples of 
courts implicitly adopting a trademark use doctrine, see Louis Vuitton Malletier v. 
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 538-39 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he Lanham Act requires a court to analyze the similarity of the products in light 
of the way in which the marks are actually displayed in their purchasing context” 
because the “Act seeks to eliminate the confusion that is created in the marketplace 
by the sale of products bearing highly similar marks.”); and Interactive Prods. 
Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Sols. Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Because 
post-domain paths do not typically signify source, it is unlikely that the presence of 
another’s trademark in a post-domain path of a URL would ever violate trademark 
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nominative use of the mark to refer to the trademark owner’s own 
goods.31 This seems easy, indeed almost tautological: Trademark 
owners don’t have to sue people for things that don’t actually violate 
their rights. I suppose some trademark owners might (wrongly) think 
such uses are infringing and therefore that they have to pursue 
parodists and nominative fair users even if they don’t want to. But the 
law already provides that trademark owners are not required to act 
against every infringing use—acting against the most damaging uses 
is sufficient.32 Even if a trademark owner thought a parody was 
infringing, that infringement would surely not be the core sort the 
policing requirement is directed against. Parodies, nominative uses, 
and the like don’t pose any of the risks that motivate policing. They 
won’t make a mark generic because they refer back to and therefore 
strengthen rather than weaken the connection between the mark and 
its owner.33 And they won’t weaken a mark by crowding the field 
because they aren’t competitive uses. At most, deciding not to sue 
                                                   
law.”). As an example of a court implicitly rejecting this trademark use doctrine, see 
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 151-52, 161-63 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(reversing summary judgment for defendant where defendant used trademark only as 
a keyword to identify when to place an ad for competing product and not in the ad 
itself).  
 31. See, e.g., Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Security 
Univ., L.L.C., 823 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2016); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. 
Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir. 2005); New Kids on the Block v. News 
Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 306-07 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding use of band’s name in 
newspaper poll was nominative under new test); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra 
note 4, at 505-08 (discussing nominative fair use doctrine and cases); McGeveran, 
supra note 9, at 88-97 (arguing that the nominative fair use doctrine fails to serve as 
an adequate “early screening mechanism”).  
 32. See, e.g., Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. 
Supp. 96, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting approvingly that plaintiff policed the two most 
damaging uses of its mark by others); Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick 
Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. Supp. 1238, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining that “a 
trademark owner is not required to act against every infringing use no matter how 
inconsequential”); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 
414, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“The owner of a mark is not required to police every 
conceivably related use . . . .”). 
 33. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 
F.3d 252, 260-61 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding plush “Chewy Vuitton” puppy toys to be a 
non-infringing parody of bags with Louis Vuitton marks because they allow 
consumers “to perceive the target of the parody, while simultaneously allowing them 
to recognize the changes to the mark that make the parody funny or biting”); Jordache 
Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1489–90 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
“it is not likely that public identification of JORDACHE with the plaintiff will be 
eroded [by defendant’s parody “Lardashe”]; indeed, parody tends to increase public 
identification of a plaintiff’s mark with the plaintiff”). 
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non-infringing parodists might raise a laches defense if a trademark 
owner later decides to sue non-infringing parodists. But so what? They 
weren’t going to win that suit anyway.34  
It can’t hurt for courts to make clear that any policing obligation 
does not extend to efforts to stop non-infringing uses like parodies. 
But for the reasons just mentioned, trademark owners—at least those 
advised by savvy counsel—should be unlikely to think they have to 
sue parodists in order to protect their mark. A more likely explanation 
is that they want to stop the parodies, either by persuading a court to 
do so or by using the cost and uncertainty of litigation to drive small 
users out of business.35 And if that’s their goal, just telling them they 
don’t need to do it won’t stop them. 
We need better reasons for trademark owners to lay off parodies 
and other socially beneficial uses of trademarks. Prior scholars have 
suggested sticks: penalties for frivolous lawsuits or for dubious threat 
letters, greater fee shifting, declaring the mark expressively generic, 
and the like.36 Those are probably good ideas, though they may not 
protect the people who most need protecting—those who fold up shop 
in response to a scary-looking cease-and-desist letter because they 
don’t know any better or can’t afford to vindicate their rights. 
                                                   
 34. McGeveran, supra note 9, at 52. 
 35. See Chan Grinvald, supra note 15, at 651 (summarizing the competitive 
benefit to mark owners from controlling their trademark while imposing costs on other 
users who may be their rivals or potential rivals); Yvette Joy Liebesman & Benjamin 
Wilson, The Mark of a Resold Good, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 163-64 (2012) 
(describing how small resellers of products may close rather than face litigation from 
those who own trademarks related to those products). Sheff refers to this as loathing-
based as opposed to fear-based enforcement. See Sheff, supra note 18, at 875-77. 
 36. See, e.g., Chan Grinvald, supra note 15, at 669 (proposing consumer-
supported shaming); Chan Grinvald, supra note 16, at 414-15 (proposing the 
regulation of cease-and-desist letters); Leah Chan Grinvald, Social Media, Sharing, 
and Intellectual Property Law, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 1045, 1072-73 (2015) (suggesting 
better access to low-cost legal services); Leah Chan Grinvald, Charitable 
Trademarks, 50 AKRON L. REV. 817, 854, 860 (2016) (suggesting heightened pleading 
requirements and social shaming, particularly against overreaching non-profits); 
Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right of Publicity Law, 
96 B.U. L. REV. 1293, 1317-18 (2016); Manta, supra note 16, at 858-62 (proposing 
judicial sanctions and fee-shifting), 862-63 (proposing measures akin to anti-SLAPP 
(Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) protections); Gallagher, supra note 
17, at 495-96; Kiser, supra note 1, at 540 (arguing for a legal right for fan sites to use 
brands); cf. Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes 
of Action, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 262 (1994) (assessing, in the copyright context, 
approaches to combating wrongful copyright infringement claims through actions 
based in breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, fraud, and false advertising); see also 
Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 399; Tang, supra note 13, at 2028-29. 
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My goal here is to suggest a carrot, not a stick. If we want 
trademark owners to be motivated not to sue parody and criticism 
sites, we should make the existence of those sites a good rather than a 
bad thing for trademark owners. I propose that the law view the 
existence of parody and criticism of a brand as affirmative evidence 
that the brand is famous and maybe even treat it as a requirement for 
fame.  
Brands want to be famous.37 Famous trademarks are strong 
marks entitled to a broader scope of protection against likely consumer 
confusion.38 Further, only famous marks are entitled to extra 
protection against trademark dilution even in the absence of consumer 
confusion.39 Once the Federal Trademark Dilution Act was passed in 
1995, many companies sought and were granted famous status for 
marks that were not actually very famous.40 Congress raised the 
standard of fame in the Trademark Dilution Reform Act of 2006. 
Under that narrowed definition, “a mark is famous if it is widely 
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a 
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”41 
Since 2006, local fame and fame in certain markets no longer count, 
and even well-known marks like those of Coach and the University of 
Texas Longhorns have been held not to qualify.42  
Fame is likely to be particularly relevant in cases of parody and 
other forms of protected speech about trademarks. Parodies, satire, and 
                                                   
 37. On the value of fame to trademark owners, see Leah Chan Grinvald, 
Contracting Trademark Fame?, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1291, 1305-11 (2016). 
 38. See Nabisco, Inc. v. P.F. Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 214-17 (2d Cir. 
1999) (setting out special statutory protections accorded famous marks and explaining 
their intent).  
 39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).  
 40. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 
L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming “The Sporting News” famous 
in sports context over vigorous dissent); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 605-06 (E.D. Va. 1997) 
(finding “Greatest Show on Earth” to be famous); Am. Exp. Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. 
Supp 310, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding “Don’t Leave Home Without It” to be a 
famous mark). In Appendix A, I contrast examples like these with others found 
famous after Congress raised the fame standard by passing the Trademark Dilution 
Reform Act of 2006. See infra app. A. 
 41. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 42. Coach Servs., Inc., v. Triumph Learning L.L.C., 668 F.3d 1356, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding Coach not famous for dilution purposes); Bd. of Regents, 
Univ. of Texas Sys. ex rel. Univ. of Texas at Austin v. KST Elec., Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 
2d 657, 678-79 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (finding the Texas Longhorn logo not famous). I 
present a full list of marks adjudicated famous and not famous under both the old and 
the new law in Appendix A. 
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criticism naturally target or employ well-known brands; making fun 
of a trademark no one has ever heard of seems a bootless enterprise, 
and a satire based on a meme no one understands won’t be very 
effective.43 Similarly, companies have a greater need to talk about 
famous marks in order to compare their goods to the market leader or 
explain why their products are, say, compatible with Apple’s iPhone. 
And the public as a whole may appropriate a mark for cultural 
conversation, but it is more likely to do so if the mark is famous and 
therefore well understood.44  
Further, each of these types of uses reinforces rather than dilutes 
the significance of the brand in question. A parody or satire only works 
because people get the joke––because they simultaneously recognize 
the reference to the brand and understand that the parody is not the 
brand.45 The point of nominative fair uses––comparative advertising, 
discussing your relationship with the branded product, and the like––
                                                   
 43. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394, 1400-01, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (satirizing the O.J. Simpson trial through a Dr. 
Seuss-styled book); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 
1611(PKC), 2012 WL 1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (satirizing luxury via 
a one-second shot of a basketball covered in Louis Vuitton marks in a Hyundai 
commercial); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (parodying “Enjoy Coca-Cola” via an “Enjoy Cocaine” poster); cf. 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (underscoring that 
“parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works” in a copyright 
context). 
 44. Barbie, for instance, has been appropriated by several artists using it as a 
shorthand to comment on society. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 
F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing “Barbie Enchiladas” visual art); Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing “The Barbie 
Girl” song). See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 1 (explaining how trademarks 
function as “ideograms” and examining the law’s difficulty in policing and protecting 
such uses appropriately). 
 45. Successful parodies are permitted not least because they do not confuse 
consumers. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 
252, 260-261 (4th Cir. 2007) (reasoning “an effective parody will actually diminish 
the likelihood of confusion” because it enables audiences “to perceive the target of 
the parody, while simultaneously allowing them to recognize the changes to the mark 
that make the parody funny or biting”); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 
F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[A] trademark parody . . . juxtapose[es] the irreverent 
representation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the mark’s 
owner.”); cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599 (explaining that the successful parodist makes 
an original statement about something already popularly known). By contrast, 
unsuccessful parodies may infringe precisely because they confuse consumers. See 
Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1405 (making this point); see also Charles E. Colman, 
Trademark Law and the Prickly Ambivalence of Post-Parodies, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 11, 41-42 (2014) (indicating the same).  
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is to use the trademark to refer not to your own goods but to the 
trademark owner’s. Similarly, trademarks in expressive products are 
there because the author wants to talk about the trademarks. They too 
reinforce the semantic connection between the brand and the product 
it refers to.46 So it makes sense to think that famous marks are the ones 
most likely to attract parodies and other speech-related uses and that 
those uses reinforce rather than dilute the significance of the mark as 
a referent for the trademark owner’s goods in the minds of the public. 
For both reasons, the presence of parodies and other referential uses 
surely correlates with fame. 
Notably, the most famous brands are also the most likely to sue 
parodists. I collected data on trademark complaints involving both 
marks held famous under the 2006 Trademark Dilution Act (TDRA) 
and marks held not famous under the same statute.47 Owners of 
trademarks held famous under the higher TDRA standard filed 562 
trademark suits involving those brands between 2007 and 2017. Of 
those cases, seventeen were brought against uses alleged to be 
parodies. By contrast, companies owning marks held not famous filed 
561 suits involving those marks, none against parodists. But almost all 
of those suits were filed by one company––Coach, which brought 540 
suits. Excluding Coach, other non-famous brands brought only 
twenty-one lawsuits, none involving parodies.48  
I don’t mean to make too much of this data. It includes only the 
actual marks held famous under the new law, not marks that are surely 
famous under both laws (e.g., Barbie, Google, and the Louis Vuitton 
“LV” logo). It excludes cease-and-desist letters that never made it to 
court and court cases that never made it to decision. And it excludes 
at least some suits against parodies by marks that are probably famous 
but whose fame was not in serious question in the case.49 So one should 
not conclude from this that people only parody famous marks.  
                                                   
 46. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and 
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 516-17, 525-27, 537 (2008) (summarizing 
and challenging the view that unauthorized uses tend to weaken or replace a mark’s 
association with a product, citing research showing “exposure to near variants or uses 
in other contexts makes the trademark more familiar and thus more easily retrieved 
from memory,” much as “Tiffany’s-the-restaurant may make us think of Tiffany’s-
the-jeweler when we are at lunch thinking of gifts for Mother’s Day”).  
 47. And by “I collected,” I mean my research assistants did all the hard work. 
 48. The complete list of cases we collected is available on request. 
 49. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., 674 F. 
App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment for defendant maker of 
“My Other Bag” referencing Louis Vuitton bag without explicitly assessing whether 
Louis Vuitton was, as it must be for federal dilution statute to apply, famous); Louis 
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Nonetheless, three things stand out. First, famous mark owners 
seem to be the only ones targeting parodies. Second, only a minority 
of famous mark owners in my study filed any claims against parodies 
at all. Many famous brands, even those who do plenty of enforcement, 
sue only traditional infringers or counterfeiters. That hasn’t prevented 
their marks from being declared famous. Third, even famous mark 
owners who do target parodies bring only a small fraction of their suits 
against parodies, meaning stopping parodies isn’t their ordinary form 
of policing.  
All of this suggests that encouraging famous mark owners to 
celebrate (or at least tolerate) parodies, satire, and other expressive 
uses is likely to be effective in targeting the worst cases of trademark 
overreach. Companies don’t need to target parodies or other 
expressive uses to survive or to thrive. 
The change I propose is simple: Courts should consider the 
existence, number, and prominence of unauthorized parodies, satires, 
or other expressive and referential uses of a mark directed at the 
general public as evidence tending to show that the mark is famous for 
both dilution and likelihood of confusion purposes, and the absence of 
such uses as tending to show that the mark is not famous and not as 
strong.50 Considering parodies as a factor favoring fame is 
straightforward to do under the judicially created likelihood of 
confusion test, which considers the strength and renown of the mark 
in assessing confusion. It is also straightforward under the existing 
dilution statute, which provides that “[i]n determining whether a mark 
possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider 
all relevant factors.”51 The existence of expressive and referential uses 
specifically seems relevant to the “extent . . . of advertising and 
publicity of the mark . . . by . . . third parties,” one of the elements for 
                                                   
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012 WL 
1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (finding that a one-second shot in Hyundai’s 
Super Bowl commercial that showed a basketball covered in interlocking LV marks 
infringed and diluted Louis Vuitton’s trademark). Louis Vuitton still had to prove 
fame, of course, but it was not in serious question. See id. at *2. 
 50. This is consistent with Lisa Ouellette’s suggestion that we judge 
trademarks in part by how people actually treat and use them in Internet searches. See 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 
351, 372 (2014). Alexandra Roberts makes a parallel suggestion—that public talk 
about marks (which can include parodies and other expressive uses) is evidence of 
secondary meaning of those marks. See Alexandra J. Roberts, Mark Talk, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3239734 (Univ. of N.H. Sch. of 
Law, Working Paper 2018). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
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fame.52 My proposal should encourage trademark lawyers to advise 
their clients to let such uses be. Trademark owners don’t need to police 
expressive uses even today, and my approach would give them a 
reason not to.  
We could go further, making the existence of parodies or 
expressive uses a requirement for fame. That would have some 
advantages, including changing the incentives of companies that are 
unquestionably famous. But that stronger version would require 
Congress to change the dilution statute.53 
                                                   
 52. Id. 
 53. There is a robust debate on whether dilution law is a good idea at all. 
Many are skeptical. See Barton Beebe, Symposium Review, The Continuing Debacle 
of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year of Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 450 
(2007) (reviewing a year’s cases and finding the dilution cause of action used 
redundantly alongside infringement cause of action, suggesting its limited value); 
Barton Beebe et al., Testing for Trademark Dilution in Court and in the Lab, 86 U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (casting doubt on evidence of dilution by blurring); 
Kenneth L. Port, The Commodification of Trademarks: Some Final Thoughts on 
Trademark Dilution, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV 669, 669 (2017) (arguing that the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act “has not been the panacea for famous marks it was intended 
to be and has created perverse unintended consequences”); Jeremy N. Sheff, Finding 
Dilution 1 (St. John’s Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 18-002, 2018) (“[W]hen we 
finally cut our way through the fog we will find that dilution is simply not there. It is, 
at bottom, an entirely empty concept . . . .”); Tushnet, supra note 46, at 568 
(concluding dilution is not well-supported by cognitive science and an 
“otherwise . . . obscure concept”). Others defend dilution law. See Jerre B. Swann, An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 975-76 
(2006); Jerre B. Swann, An Intuitive Approach to Dilution, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 907, 
907 (1999). For an overview of dilution doctrine and the theory that underlies it—or 
not—see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn 
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1197-1200 (2006). There is also some 
question of whether it is constitutional after Matal v. Tam, which invalidated one of 
the trademark statute’s restrictions on speech for being insufficiently narrow for the 
purposes of facilitating commerce. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764-65 (2017) 
(holding Lanham Act’s requirement that the Patent and Trademark Office deny 
registration to disparaging marks violated First Amendment because it was not 
“narrowly drawn” to bar only commercially disruptive marks); see also Lisa P. 
Ramsey, Free Speech Challenges to Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, 56 HOUS. 
L. REV. 401, 401-02 (2018).  
I am sensitive to the concern that my proposal may enable companies to use the 
dilution statute when we might be better off not having one at all. But we have dilution 
law, and in this paper I take it for granted. Further, even if we were to eliminate 
dilution law, fame still matters to infringement law, because famous marks are—
rightly or wrongly—given broader protection than less famous marks. Cf. Barton 
Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong Marks: Should Trademark Law 
Protect the Strong More Than the Weak?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2017) 
(arguing that strong marks are actually less likely to be confused with imitations). So 
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Indeed, one might worry about the opposite problem—
companies trying to encourage or fake parodies or other expressive 
uses to meet the new requirement of fame. Courts should ensure that 
the uses in question are independent and unauthorized. For my 
proposal to work, a company should not be able to point to expressive 
uses of its work if it also sues or threatens those uses. Indeed, suing 
expressive users should probably disqualify the company from relying 
on expressive uses to prove fame altogether.54 It certainly shouldn’t be 
able to both try to shut down a parody or nominative use and also be 
able to point to that use as evidence of fame. Requiring that the 
expressive uses be truly independent may also help avoid a related 
problem—the assumption that everything requires a license and that 
the “safe” thing to do is get one even for uses the law expressly 
permits.55 
My proposal won’t prevent all trademark overreach by any 
means. Some companies just don’t like being made fun of, and they 
may continue to threaten suit whether the law supports them or not. 
So it may make sense to combine this proposal with other efforts to 
punish trademark overreach56 to make clearer that these uses are 
lawful.57 But if the goal is to change trademark owner behavior, giving 
them an affirmative reason to tolerate parodies and other expressive 
uses—and giving their lawyers a reason to counsel restraint58—is a 
logical way to get there.59 
                                                   
even without dilution traditional trademark owners will seek fame, and we can use 
that desire to achieve social good. 
 54. Some rare suits against expressive uses might have merit, and those 
should not be disqualifying. 
 55. See Gibson, supra note 15, at 884, 907-08, 912-27 (examining how 
trademark owners’ “rights” snowball when others believe it is “[b]etter [to be] safe 
than sued”); cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 12 
(2004) (describing “the permission culture that our law has produced” in copyright).  
 56. See supra text accompanying note 36 (citing other scholars who suggest 
legal sticks, social shame, and other remedies). 
 57. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 4, at 474 (arguing for positive doctrinal 
reforms to increase clarity and predictability given that current confusion leaves 
“would-be parodists vulnerable to threats of legal action by trademark holders”); 
McGeveran, supra note 9, at 49 (making a similar point about the problem of 
uncertainty and recommending “simpler affirmative defenses that reduce uncertainty 
and allow for quick adjudication”).  
 58. On the role of lawyers in encouraging or restraining client impulses to 
attack uses they dislike, see Sheff, supra note 18, at 882. 
 59. As Glynn Lunney has observed, trademark law often moves in the wrong 
direction because rules that promote competition generally hurt the self-interest of 
repeat players in trademark cases, who want to capture rents by excluding 
competition. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution: 
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CONCLUSION 
Trademark owners often threaten parodists, satirists, and others 
who make lawful expressive uses of their marks, offering the rationale 
that they must police their mark against infringement or lose it. But 
they shouldn’t. The law doesn’t require policing such uses. Parody, 
criticism, and being part of the cultural conversation come with the 
territory of fame. The law should reflect that by treating the existence 
of those referential uses as indicating that the trademark is strong. By 
doing so, the law can help align the incentives of trademark owners 
with good public policy.  
  
                                                   
Why Courts Get Trademark Cases Wrong Repeatedly, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1195 
(2018). Giving trademark owners an incentive to align their behavior with good social 
policy might help to break that cycle.  
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APPENDIX A 
Fame of Marks Adjudicated Before and After the Trademark 
Dilution Reform Act of 2006 
 
Famous 
 
1996 2006 
AOL Adidas three-stripe mark 
Arthur the Aardvark Audi 
Audi America’s Team (Dallas Cowboys) 
Barbie Apple iPhone trade dress 
Budweiser Big Gulp  
Camel BlackBerry 
Candyland Burberry 
Cartier Chanel 
Don’t Leave Home Without Us Citibank 
Etch-A-Sketch Delta 
Goldfish Just Do It 
Ford Louis Vuitton Multicolore 
Greatest Show on Earth (circus) McDonald’s “Mc” prefix 
Hotmail Miss USA 
Intermatic Motown 
James Bond Newport 
Jews for Jesus NYC Triathlon 
Lexington Nike 
Nailtiques Pepsi 
NASDAQ Rolex 
NBA logo Rolls-Royce 
Nike Starbucks 
Panavision The House that Ruth Built 
Porsche The Other White Meat 
Prozac Viagra 
Sporting News Victoria’s Secret 
Toys ‘R Us Visa 
Tylenol  
Velveeta  
Victoria’s Secret  
Wawa  
Winston  
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Not Famous 
 
1996 2006 
Applesee App Store 
Authority Bio-Safe 
Avery Dennison Charlotte 
Bongo Coach 
Clue It’s A 
Columbia Lingo (food market in Del.) 
Dearest Magenta color (T-Mobile) 
Fun Ship Marker’s Mark trade dress 
King of the Mountain Sports Majestic 
Lane Capital Management Movie Mania 
Petro Rocky Top 
Star Market Steak-umm 
Stealth Top 
Children’s Place University of Texas longhorn logo 
Teton Glacier  
Tornado  
Trek  
Tycos  
We  
Weather Guard  
Washington Speakers Bureau  
We’ll Pick You Up  
We’ll Take Good Care of You  
 
